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 Freedom from Detention: The Constitutionality 
of Mandatory Detention for Criminal Aliens 
Seeking to Challenge Grounds for Removal 
By Darlene C. Goring* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The systemic dysfunction of our current immigration system 
has never been more readily apparent than when examining the 
lack of uniformity in mandatory detention and bond 
determinations for a limited class of criminal aliens1 in removal 
proceedings.  What was envisioned by the constitutional framers 
as a uniform national immigration framework has deteriorated 
into a jurisprudential quagmire.  As a result, it oftentimes 
infringes upon the due process protections afforded to aliens 
subject to removal2 from the United States who do not concede 
that they are either “deportable” under section 237 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 
 
       * Sam D’Amico Endowed Professor of Law and Nolan J. Edwards Professor of Law, 
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.  The author wishes to thank John 
Peacock and Matthew O. Boles for their wonderful research assistance.  This article is 
dedicated to my inspirational guide, Reverend Franklin R. Clark, Pastor at Mt. Olivette 
Baptist Church. 
1.  The phrase “criminal alien” is used by the author throughout this research project 
to refer to a class of aliens convicted of one or more of the enumerated predicate offenses set 
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). 
2.  Aliens subject to removal from the United States are governed by the Immigration 
and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012).  See also United States v. Lopez-
Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 479 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Before IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996, 
individuals such as Lopez-Vasquez who were ineligible for admission into the United States 
and were never admitted into the United States were referred to as ‘excludable’ while aliens 
who had gained admission, but later became subject to expulsion from the United States, 
were referred to as ‘deportable’ . . . . In addition, the IIRIRA [Illegal Immigration and 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] has ‘done away with the previous legal 
distinction among deportation, removal, and exclusion proceedings . . . . Now, the term 
‘removal proceedings’ refers to proceedings applicable to both inadmissible and deportable 
aliens.”). 
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1227,3 or “inadmissible” under section 212 of the INA, codified 
as 8 U.S.C. § 1182.4 
Generally, all aliens who are apprehended by immigration 
enforcement agencies within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)5 are subject to civil detention—due to their 
inadmissibility or deportability—until such time as removal 
proceedings pursuant to Section 240 of the INA, codified as 8 
U.S.C. § 1229(a)6 are concluded.  Detention facilities are secure, 
prison-like facilities that are usually located in remote, rural 
areas.7  In recognition of the quasi-criminal nature of the 
detention process, section 1226(a) affords aliens an opportunity 
to request release from detention upon posting a bond.8  However, 
this practice does not apply to aliens subject to certain statutorily 
enumerated criminal convictions. 
Section 236(c) of the INA, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),9 
authorizes apprehension and mandatory detention without an 
 
3.  Aliens admitted to the United States are subject to the deportation provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012). 
4.  Aliens who seek admission to the United States are subject to the provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012). 
5.  See generally Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., 
http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/BBZ6-WC3L] (“On March 1, 
2003, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officially assumed responsibility 
for the immigration service functions of the federal government.  The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135) dismantled the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and separated the former agency into three components within 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).”).  The Homeland Security Act created USCIS 
to enhance the security and efficiency of national immigration services by focusing 
exclusively on the administration of benefit applications.  Id.  The law also formed 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to 
oversee immigration enforcement and border security.  Id; see also Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 
345 F.3d 824, 828 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 
6.  Aliens subject to removal from the United States.  For the removal provisions, see 
generally Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229. 
7.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF 
FACILITY COSTS AND STANDARDS 1, 9-10 (2014), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666467.pdf [https://perma.cc/38CJ-78DJ]; Dagmar R. 
Myslinska, Living Conditions in Immigration Detention Centers, NOLO, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/living-conditions-immigration-detention-
centers.html [https://perma.cc/XA8V-ZSK7]. 
8.  See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
9.  Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c) (2014), 66 Stat. 200).  This was originally enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Div. C of Pub. L. 104–208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546.  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, 
CORNELL U. L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., 
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individualized bond hearing of aliens during the pendency of 
removal hearings initiated pursuant to INA § 240 who are either 
deportable or inadmissible, upon their release from criminal 
custody after conviction for a statutorily enumerated list10 of 
predicate crimes set forth in § 1226(c)(1), including aggravated 
felonies,11 crimes involving moral turpitude,12 and terrorist 
activities.13  As a result, upon release from criminal custody, 
aliens who were convicted of the statutorily enumerated predicate 
offenses are subject to mandatory detention by the Department of 
Homeland Security.  Upon release from criminal custody, these 
criminal aliens must remain in detention and are not eligible to 
post a bond to gain their release.14  This results in a prolonged 
detention15 of all criminal aliens, including a cohort of criminal 
aliens who may successfully challenge efforts to remove them 
from the country. 
It is an unassailable principle of both immigration and 
constitutional law that Congress is authorized to detain aliens who 
are subject to removal from the United States because they are 
either inadmissible or deportable.  In Wong Wing v. United 
States,16 the United States Supreme Court held that 
“[p]roceedings to exclude or expel would be in vain if those 
accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into 
their true character, and while arrangements were being made for 
 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_responsib
ility_act [https://perma.cc/PW3B-VTFW]. 
10.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)-(d) (2012). 
11.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 2014). 
12.  See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALIEN REMOVALS AND RETURNS: 
OVERVIEW AND TRENDS 4, n.28 (2015) (“Moral turpitude is not defined under immigration 
law, and has been determined by case law.  In general, if a crime manifests an element of 
baseness, vileness, or depravity under current mores—if it evidences an evil or predatory 
intent—it involves moral turpitude.  For example, crimes such as murder, rape, blackmail, 
tax evasion, and fraud have been considered to involve moral turpitude, whereas crimes such 
as simple assault, possessing stolen property, and forgery have not.  The flexibility in the 
term is to allow for changing social norms.”). 
13.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
14.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). 
15.  Prolonged detention is defined as lengthy detention of criminal aliens when 
removal proceedings are pending but no order of removal has been issued.  AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION: IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT, PROLONGED IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING REMOVAL 1 (2009)                     
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file766_40474.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MLU9-8LK5].   
16.  163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
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their deportation.”17  The extent of Congressional authority to 
detain aliens has expanded since the Court considered this issue 
in 1896.  Under the current immigration framework governing 
detention, Congress mandates the civil detention of aliens 
awaiting completion of removal proceedings upon their release 
from criminal custody.  The United States Supreme Court in 
Demore v. Kim18 held that mandatory “[d]etention during 
removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that 
process.”19 
However, aliens present in the United States are entitled to 
assert due process protections which include a fundamental 
liberty interest in being free from unlawful detention that violates 
their substantive due process protections.  The criminal aliens in 
Demore, like many other aliens in similar situations, often 
concede that they are subject to removal due to their 
inadmissibility or deportability.20  However, Demore left open the 
question of whether mandatory detention is constitutionally 
permissible for criminal aliens who want to assert colorable 
challenges to their removal.21  The Seventh Circuit is the only 
federal circuit that has provided some guidance as to the 
circumstances under which criminal aliens can seek to avoid 
mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing by 
asserting a colorable claim that they are not subject to removal. 
This article will examine the narrow question left unresolved 
by the Court’s decision in Demore regarding “whether mandatory 
detention under § 1226(c) is consistent with due process when a 
detainee makes a colorable claim that he is not in fact 
deportable.”22  This article will examine the Seventh Circuit’s 
application of that language to provide heightened due process 
protections to aliens facing mandatory detention.  It will also 
 
17.  Id. at 235; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[T]his Court has 
recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the 
deportation process.”). 
18.  538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
19.  Id. at 531. 
20.  News Release, Dep’t of Justice: Exec. Office for Immigration Review, 
Immigration Court Process in the U.S. (2005) (2005 WL 3541986) (“In most removal 
proceedings, aliens concede that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms 
of relief from removal.”); Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. 
21.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (“The INS detention of respondent, a criminal alien who 
has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings, is 
governed by these cases.”). 
22.  Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004). 
2017] FREEDOM FROM DETENTION 915 
examine the application of section 1226(c) to aliens in removal 
proceedings and discuss the due process implications arising from 
mandatory detention of aliens in removal proceedings. 
This article will argue that the current statutory and 
jurisprudential framework governing mandatory detention 
without bond for criminal aliens who do not concede removability 
violates the due process protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment.23  Finally, it will propose a modification to the 
current mandatory detention framework that will offer heightened 
protection of the fundamental liberty interests held by criminal 
aliens. 
II.  MANDATORY DETENTION OF CRIMINAL 
ALIENS PENDING REMOVAL UNDER SECTION 
1226(C) 
Criminalization24 of the immigration process makes 
mandatory detention without bond necessary to enable the federal 
government to effectuate the removal of criminal aliens. 
Provisions of the INA are designed to work in tandem to achieve 
this congressional goal.  However, the combined lack of 
uniformity between the federal circuits regarding the 
interpretation and application of § 1226(c) has created a 
patchwork of immigration policies that conflict with the due 
process protections afforded to all persons—including criminal 
aliens—present in the United States. 
It is important to note that there is not a perfect correlation 
between apprehension, detention, and eventual removal of 
criminal aliens from the United States.  In 1996, Congress 
recognized, when debating the purposes underlying the adoption 
 
23.  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “No person 
shall . . .  be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
24.  In response to the perception that crimes committed by aliens were increasing, 
Congress enacted several key legislative reforms aimed at expanding the categories of 
criminal convictions that would subject aliens to determinations of inadmissibility, 
deportability, and ultimate removal from the United States.  See, e.g., Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009-546 (1996) (codified in titles 8 and 18 of the U.S. Code); Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified 
in titles 8, 18, 28, 40, and 42 of the U.S. Code).  For a discussion about the legislative history 
of § 1226(c), see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).  “Congress adopted this 
provision against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of 
criminal activity by aliens.”  Id. 
916 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69:911 
of § 1226(c), that there is a small cohort of criminal aliens who 
would not be removed despite their eligibility for removal.25  In 
his report to the House of Representatives, Congressman Henry 
Hyde discussed the growing number of incarcerated aliens who 
were foreign born.  Although the number was significant, he 
estimated that twenty percent of those incarcerated aliens “are not 
deportable because they are either naturalized citizens or lawful 
permanent residents with protection from deportation.”26 
Generally, the Attorney General may exercise discretion in 
deciding whether to detain an alien during removal proceedings.  
Section 1226(a) provides in pertinent part that “an alien may be 
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is 
to be removed from the United States.”27  That exercise of 
discretion is not available for a limited class of aliens who 
committed one of the enumerated crimes set forth in Section 
1226(c). 
Section 1226(c) requires the Department of Homeland 
Security to detain without bond any alien released from custody 
for commission of an enumerated list of crimes pending 
completion of removal proceedings.28  Predicate offenses or 
predicate crimes (A)-(D) that trigger mandatory detention include 
crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, controlled 
substance offenses, terrorist activities, and firearms offenses.29 
Aliens subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) are 
entitled to review of their custody determination by an 
immigration judge.30  In Joseph,31 the procedures required by this 
hearing, which is commonly referred to as a “Joseph hearing,” 
were examined.32  A Joseph hearing affords an alien the 
opportunity to challenge the mandatory detention determination 
on the basis that the alien was “properly included”33 within the 
 
25.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 520-21. 
26.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 118 (1996). 
27.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).  
28.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). 
29.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
30.  See Gayle v. Johnson, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 379-81 (D.N.J. 2015). 
31.  22 I. & N. 799 (1999). 
32.  Id. at 800-06. 
33.  Id. at 800-02; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii) (2016); see also Gayle, 81 F. Supp. 3d 
at 381.  The criminal aliens in a putative class action challenged “the adequacy of the Joseph 
hearing.”  Id. at 379.  The plaintiffs successfully argued “that Joseph hearings do not satisfy 
due process because the burden of proof on aliens during such hearings is unconstitutionally 
burdensome.”  Id. at 388-89.  The court agreed and imposed “a probable cause standard on 
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category of criminal aliens subject to mandatory detention under 
§ 1226(c).34  In a Joseph hearing, the alien has an opportunity to 
demonstrate that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (BICE) is “substantially unlikely to establish” that 
the alien is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 
1226(c).35  In Joseph, the BIA held “that a lawful permanent 
resident will not be considered ‘properly included’ in a mandatory 
detention category when an Immigration Judge or the Board is 
convinced that the Service is substantially unlikely to establish at 
the merits hearing, or on appeal, the charge or charges that would 
otherwise subject the alien to mandatory detention.”36  If 
 
the [Immigration Judge’s] initial determination of whether the Government has a sufficient 
basis to detain individuals under § 1226(c).”  Id. at 398.  Because of this ruling, the district 
court rejected “[p]laintiff’s proposed standard—a  showing that the alien has a substantial 
challenge to the Government’s basis for detention under § 1226(c), as opposed to the alien’s 
current standard of showing the Government is substantially unlikely to prevail—is 
constitutionally required.”  Id.  The court found that under this structure, “the alien will have 
received constitutionally sustainable due process.”  Gayle, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 398.  The court 
denied Plaintiff’s motion to certify class.  Id. at 404-05.  The parties appealed.  See Garfield 
Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (“On appeal, 
Appellants, joined by numerous amici, challenge the merits of the District Court’s 
substantive and procedural due process rulings, as well as its denial of their motion to certify 
a class, and the Government has responded point by point.  Yet, as the parties conceded at 
oral argument in response to inquiry by the Court, Oral Arg. at 17:56, 38:01 (argued Feb. 10, 
2016), the District Court did not have authority to reach the merits.  Nor do we.  The District 
Court’s judgment therefore must be vacated and the case remanded for consideration of the 
only issue over which it had jurisdiction: the motion for class certification.”). 
34.  The alien has the burden of proving that the government is “substantially unlikely” 
to prevail in proving that § 1226(c) is applicable to the alien.  See Casas v. Devane, No. 15-
cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293598, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2015) (“[A]ny alien may challenge at 
an administrative hearing the determination that he is ‘properly included’ in the categories 
of aliens subject to mandatory detention under 1226(c).  The alien may then appeal the IJ’s 
determination as to the applicability of 1226(c) to the BIA.  Unlike a removability 
determination, the BIA’s review of the applicability 1226(c) is not appealable to a federal 
court of appeals.”) (citations omitted). 
35.  Joseph, 22 I. & N. 799, 806 (1999). 
36.  Id.  In Tijani v. Willis, the concurring opinion clearly set forth criticism of the 
Joseph decision by stating: 
The BIA’s Joseph decision was, plainly put, wrong.  There can be no doubt 
that individual liberty is one of the most fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution . . . . Joseph, which was decided prior to Zadvydas, gives that 
right little or no weight.  Instead, it establishes a system of “detention by 
default” by placing the burden fully on the alien to prove that he should not be 
detained.  When such a fundamental right is at stake, however, the Supreme 
Court has insisted on heightened procedural protections to guard against the 
erroneous deprivation of that right.  In particular, the Supreme Court has time 
and again rejected laws that place on the individual the burden of protecting 
his or her fundamental rights.   
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successful, the alien’s detention is deemed discretionary and the 
alien is thereafter entitled to an individualized bond hearing 
within the scope of INA § 1226(a).37  At the individualized bond 
hearing, the government has an opportunity to demonstrate that 
continued detention is necessary.38 
Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges raised in 
the form of habeas petitions39 against mandatory detention and 
bond requests.40  Section 236(e) bars federal courts from 
reviewing challenges to an Immigration Judge’s discretionary 
decision regarding bond and detention.  However, in federal 
court,41 aliens may assert challenges to “the statutory framework 
that permits his detention without bail.”42 
Section 1226(e) bars review of the Attorney General’s 
“discretionary judgment,” and an “action or decision by the 
Attorney General” regarding detention and/or bond 
determinations.43  However, the Supreme Court in Demore held 
that notwithstanding this language, aliens may assert “challenges 
 
430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring).  Judge Tashima expressed 
concern that the standard articulated in Joseph did not afford aliens facing mandatory 
detention under § 1226(c) a sufficient opportunity to challenge the detention before being 
subject to the deprivation of their fundamental liberty interests.  Id. at 1244-45.  Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Demore was cited to argue that the Joseph analysis should be 
narrowly interpreted.  Id. at 1246-47.  Justice Breyer argued that “[Section 1226(c)] tells the 
Attorney General to ‘take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable,’ not one who may, 
or may not, fall into that category.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 578 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  However, Judge Tashima argued that “[o]nly those 
immigrants who could not raise a ‘substantial’ argument against their removability should 
be subject to mandatory detention . . . . This interpretation is not only more respectful of the 
Constitution, it is also more consistent with Congress’ chosen language.”  Tijani, 430 F.3d 
at 1247 (Tashima, J., concurring).  
37.  Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F. Supp. 2d 759, 766 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2013). 
38.  Baidas v. Jennings, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
39.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012).  District courts have the power to grant habeas corpus 
relief to aliens where their custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012). 
40.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012).  “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment 
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review.  No court may set 
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the 
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”  Id. 
41.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit 
provision barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent’s 
constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”). 
42.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e); see also Bugianishvili v. McConnell, No. 1:15-cv-3360, 
2015 WL 3903460, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
43.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012). 
2017] FREEDOM FROM DETENTION 919 
to the statutory framework that permits detention without bail.”44  
In Demore, the Court concluded, “Section 1226(e) contains no 
explicit provision barring habeas review, and we think that its 
clear text does not bar respondent’s constitutional challenge to the 
legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”45 
The imprecise language of § 1226(c) has resulted in a 
growing and conflicting body of jurisprudence regarding the 
nature of the mandatory detention obligation that Congress 
imposed on immigration officials.46  A split has emerged in the 
federal circuits regarding the interpretation and application of § 
1226(c) for mandatory detention without bond for criminal aliens 
released from criminal custody. 
For example, the First Circuit interprets the language of § 
1226(c) as temporal in nature, and holds that § 1226(c) only 
requires immigration officials to detain criminal aliens convicted 
of a predicate crime, immediately after the criminal alien is 
released from custody.47  Other federal circuits have adopted a 
conflicting interpretation.  In the Second, Third, Fourth and Tenth 
Federal Circuits, § 1226(c) is interpreted as “duty triggering” 
language that permits immigration officials to apprehend and 
detain a criminal alien “at any time” after the alien was released 
from criminal custody.48  In addition, federal circuits are also in 
conflict regarding whether prolonged detention of criminal aliens 
subject to mandatory detention without bond may run afoul of the 
 
44.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 517; Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
45.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 517; Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1014. 
46.  Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring) 
(“As with most statutes, the relatively simple mandate of § 236(c) leaves many questions 
unanswered, the most important of which is who, exactly, falls under the statute’s provisions.  
The statute states only that mandatory detention applies to an alien who ‘is deportable by 
reason of having committed’ a number of specified criminal offenses, but does not define 
those offenses with precision, nor does it define what ‘is deportable’ means.”). 
47.  See Castaneda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]e conclude that the 
‘when . . . released’ clause imposes a deadline for picking up an alien coming out of criminal 
custody that limits the application of (c)(2)’s bar to bonded release.”); Id. at 39.   
48.  See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 611 (2d Cir. 2015); Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 
714 F.3d 150, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 384 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1327 (10th Cir. 2015).  These federal circuits deferred to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) ruling that “‘when. . . released’ does not impose a 
temporal restriction on the agency’s authority and duty to detain an alien.”  Lora, 804 F.3d 
at 610 (citing Rojas, 23 I. & N. 117, 120-21, 127 (2001). 
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Due Process Clause.49  The Supreme Court has not weighed in to 
resolve these issues.50 
III.  DEMORE V. KIM 
Non-punitive civil detentions51 are generally not 
constitutionally permissible except during times of “global war or 
domestic insurrection”52 as illustrated by the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II.53  However, within the 
field of immigration, civil detention of aliens is permissible, and 
does not infringe upon the protection afforded to aliens under the 
Due Process Clause.54  Congress’s power to detain aliens is a 
longstanding principle of immigration law.  In Wong Wing v. 
United States,55 the Supreme Court acknowledged that detention 
is an integral component of the admission and removal process 
within the immigration field: 
We think it clear that detention, or temporary 
confinement, as part of the means necessary to give 
effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion 
of aliens would be valid.  Proceedings to exclude or 
expel would be in vain if those accused could not be 
held in custody pending the inquiry into their true 
character and while arrangements were being made for 
 
49.  A number of federal circuits (including the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits) 
adopted the analysis introduced by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Demore.  
Justice Kennedy argued that mandatory detention without bond subject to § 1226(c) could 
infringe upon an alien’s liberty interest where such “continued detention became 
unreasonable or unjustified.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  In such circumstances, continued detention would be appropriate only upon a 
showing by the government that the alien was a “risk of flight or dangerous[].”  Id. at 532-
33.  In the absence of either circumstance, an alien who had been unreasonably or 
unjustifiably detained for a prolonged time period would thereafter fall within the parameters 
of § 1226(a) and be entitled to an individualized bond determination.  The Second Circuit 
rejected the “fact-dependent inquiry” in favor of a bright-line rule that a “six-month period” 
of detention is presumptively reasonable.  See Lora, 804 F.3d at 614-15. 
50.  For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the conflicting interpretation and 
application of § 1226(c), see Gerard Savaresse, Note, When is When?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 
and the Requirements of Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285 (2013). 
51.  Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (defining non-punitive 
civil detentions as detentions that are “merely preventative”). 
52.  Id. at 1074. 
53.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-17, 223 (1944). 
54.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”). 
55.  163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
2017] FREEDOM FROM DETENTION 921 
their deportation.  Detention is a usual feature in every 
case of arrest on a criminal charge, even when an 
innocent person is wrongfully accused; but it is not 
imprisonment in a legal sense.56 
The question remaining after Wong Wing was the extent of 
Congress’s power to detain.  In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme 
Court addressed the constitutionality of civil detentions by 
immigration officials and held that “[d]etention during removal 
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that 
process.”57  Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court held 
that, “Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal 
aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail 
to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may 
require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief 
period necessary for their removal proceedings.”58 
The criminal alien in Demore, a South Korean citizen, was a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States.59  Mr. Kim was 
convicted of burglary and petty theft, and charged with being 
deportable for those crimes.60  The INS and the Court adopted the 
position that Mr. Kim conceded that he was deportable and 
consequently, proceeded with their analyses on that basis.61 
There appeared to be a disputed question regarding whether 
Mr. Kim conceded deportability, and in doing so “forwent a 
hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any 
nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not 
 
56.  Id. at 235. 
57.  Demore v. Kim, 583 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).  “At the same time, however, this Court 
has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of 
the deportation process.”  Id. at 523. 
58.  Id. at 513. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (“Respondent also did not dispute that INS’ conclusion 
that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) . . . . In conceding that he was 
deportable, respondent forwent a hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any 
nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included in a 
mandatory detention category.”).  However, the varying opinion of the Court stated, “At the 
outset, there is the Court’s mistaken suggestion that Kim ‘conceded’ his removability . . . . 
The Court cites no statement before any court about conceding removability, and I can find 
none.”  Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See id. at 577 (Breyer, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This case, however, is not one in which an 
alien concedes deportability.  As Justice Souter pointed out, Kim argues to the contrary . . . 
. Kim claims that his earlier convictions were neither for an ‘aggravated felony’ nor for two 
crimes of ‘moral turpitude.’”). 
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properly included in a mandatory detention category.”62  
However, a Joseph hearing would not have assisted Mr. Kim. The 
Joseph hearing would have permitted him to address the question 
of whether “his criminal convictions are not for removable 
offenses.”63  However, Mr. Kim also challenged the 
government’s ultimate ability to remove him from the country.64  
Mr. Kim asserted that, notwithstanding his criminal convictions, 
he was “independently eligible for statutory relief from 
removal.”65  Kim argued on appeal that his prior crimes did not 
constitute aggravated felonies or crimes involving moral 
turpitude.66  Had Mr. Kim been successful, he would not have 
been subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and would 
have been eligible for an individualized bond hearing under § 
1226(a) to determine if he was entitled to post bond. 
The Supreme Court held that its decision was based on the 
fact that he “conced[ed] that he is deportable” in his habeas 
petition.67  The Court did note, however, that Mr. Kim “did not 
concede that he will ultimately be deported.  As the dissent notes, 
respondent has applied for withholding of removal.”68  The 
parameters of a Joseph hearing are not broad enough to include 
an evaluation of removability.69  In the event that Mr. Kim’s 
arrests fell within the categories of predicate crimes enumerated 
in § 1226(c), he still would have been subject to mandatory 
detention.  The fact that Mr. Kim may have been eligible for 
withholding of removal was irrelevant to the Immigration Judge 
evaluating his case, and would not have prevented immigration 
officials from subjecting him to mandatory detention without an 
individualized bond hearing.70 
 
62.  Id. at 514.  “Nor did he argue that he himself was not ‘deportable’ within the 
meaning of § 1226(c).”  Id. at 522. 
63.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
The Supreme Court did not address these arguments because Kim asserted them for the first 
time on appeal.  See id. at 522 n.6. 
64.  Id. at 541-42 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
65.  Id. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
66.  Id. at 522 n.6. 
67.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 n.6. 
68.  Id. at 522-23 n.6. 
69.  Id. at 514 n.3 (“At the hearing, the detainee may avoid mandatory detention by 
demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not convicted of the predicate crime, or that the 
INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory 
detention.”). 
70.  Id. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The suggestion 
that Kim should have contested his removability in this habeas corpus petition . . . misses the 
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In Demore, the Court examined the legislative history of § 
1226(c) to determine whether mandatory detention was 
constitutionally permissible.71  The legislative history revealed 
that the purpose of such detentions was two-fold:  first, to reduce 
the risk of flight; second, to minimize the danger to the public 
from criminal aliens.72  In Demore, the Supreme Court 
determined that a limited period of detention was constitutionally 
permissible because it was reasonably related to the limited 
purpose of “preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing 
prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the 
chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully 
removed.”73  Although the Court did not impose a specific time 
 
point that all he claims, or could now claim, is that his detention pending removal 
proceedings violates the Constitution.  Challenges to removability itself, and applications for 
relief from removal, are usually submitted in the first instance to an immigration judge . . . . 
The Immigration Judge had not yet held an initial hearing on the substantive issue of 
removability when Kim filed his habeas petition in the District Court, even though Kim had 
been detained for over three months under § 1226(c).  If Kim’s habeas corpus petition had 
claimed ‘that he himself was not “deportable,”’ as the Court suggests it should have . . . the 
District Court would probably have dismissed the claim as unexhausted.”).  
71.  Id. at 514-16. 
72.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 515.  However, in Gayle v. Johnson, the court noted the 
following: 
While it appears that the primary basis for mandatory detention was 
congressional concern over the possibility that potentially deportable aliens 
who were not detained would fail to appear for their removal proceedings, 
frustrating the Government’s removal efforts, . . . nevertheless, the reports and 
data relied on by Congress in enacting § 1226(c), and by the Supreme Court in 
upholding the constitutionality of the law, have been heavily criticized by 
several scholarly commentators as inaccurate and misleading.  Scholars 
question whether there was in fact a significant percentage of removable aliens 
who actually appeared before an Immigration Judge for a bond hearing that 
then failed to return for their remaining proceedings.  
4 F. Supp. 3d 692, 709-10 n.25 (D.N.J. 2014). 
73.  Id. at 528.  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, held that detention 
is permissible for post-removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which allows immigration officials 
to detain without bond following an order of removal.  533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).  The Court 
did, however, impose a temporal limit on the length of post-removal detention without bond:  
Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, we 
recognize that period.  After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good 
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence 
sufficient to rebut that showing.  And for detention to remain reasonable, as 
the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the 
“reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink.  This 6-
month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed 
must be released after six months.  To the contrary, an alien may be held in 
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period for the detention, the Court did instruct that the detention 
should be for a brief period of time.74 
It is important to note that the duration of pre-removal 
immigration detention for extended periods of time can trigger 
due process concerns.  Justice Kennedy authored a concurring 
opinion in Demore in which he addressed the length of pre-
removal detentions.  He argued that “since the Due Process 
Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful 
permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to 
an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and 
dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or 
unjustified.”75  Such extended periods of detention may run afoul 
of the Due Process Clause unless immigration officials can 
demonstrate that the continued detention is necessary because the 
alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community.76  The 
constitutionality of prolonged detention is of little significance to 
a criminal alien who immigration officials cannot ultimately 
remove from the country.  Prolonged detention for criminal aliens 
who do not concede removability are not permitted to assert a 
challenge to their ultimate removability before they are detained 
without the opportunity for an individualized bond hearing.  This 
type of detention serves only one purpose; to further penalize 
criminal aliens after their release from criminal custody.  This is 
not a constitutionally permissible reason for subjecting aliens to 
civil detention.  For this cohort of criminal aliens, mandatory 
detention without bond infringes upon the substantive due process 
protections afforded by the Constitution to be free from 
unreasonable restraint. 
IV.  SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS APPLYING 
DEMORE 
 
confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood 
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 
 Id. at 701. 
74.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 598, 513 (2003) (“We hold that Congress, justifiably 
concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime 
and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such 
as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”). 
75.  Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
76.  Id. 
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For nearly twenty years, courts within the Seventh Circuit 
have consistently held that the mandatory detention statute “is 
unconstitutional as applied to prisoners who have a good-faith 
claim that they will ultimately be permitted to remain in the 
country.”77  In addition to Seventh Circuit precedent,78 in Justice 
 
77.  See Forbes v. Perryman, 244 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  In Forbes, a 
lawful permanent resident from Jamaica lived in the United States since 1967.  Id. at 948.  
Forbes was detained since June 10, 2002, to at least when the order was issued February 14, 
2003.  Id. at 947-48.  He was detained in 2002 for a 1995 conviction for “unlawful delivery 
of cannabis,” which was found subject to mandatory detention under § 236(c).  Id.  Forbes 
presented “a good-faith defense to removal.”  Id. at 949. 
Mr. Forbes was erroneously denied the opportunity to file for relief under § 
212(c) of the [INA] as allowed by INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 329 [] (2001) 
(holding that provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 repealing discretionary relief form removal do not 
apply retroactively to aliens who pleaded guilty to possession of controlled 
substances prior to the enactment of the statute). 
Forbes, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 949.  The court held that “Mr. Forbes is entitled to an 
individualized bond hearing, and [] order[ed] the [INS] to provide him with such a hearing 
within two weeks.”  Id. at 950.  In Patel v. Ridge, the court stated that “[s]everal judges of 
this court have held that [S]ection 1226(c) is unconstitutional as applied to detainees who 
have a ‘good-faith claim’ that they will ultimately be permitted to remain in the country.”  
No. 04 C 2109, 2004 WL 1595362, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2004).  In Patel, a lawful 
permanent resident, convicted of “the offense of False Declarations before a Grand Jury,” 
was charged with removability “as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.”  Id.  The 
alien asserted that “he [had] a ‘good-faith claim’ that he [was] not deportable, and, therefore, 
that detention pursuant to section 1226(c) [was] unconstitutional as applied to him.”  Id. at 
*2.  The District Court rejected Patel’s argument as “conclusory,” and determined that he 
“neither cited, quoted, nor developed any argument regarding this precedent and statutory 
law.”  Id.  In Bonsol v. Perryman, the court found that the criminal alien did not concede 
removability and “raise[d] a good-faith challenge to his removal based on his assertion that 
he was not ‘convicted’ under Illinois law.”  240 F. Supp. 2d 823, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  The 
district court found a Fifth Amendment violation because as applied, § 1226(c) “is not 
narrowly tailored because it adopts a categorical approach to detention based only on the 
criterion of lack of United States citizenship.”  Id. at 827. 
78.  To a very limited extent, other jurisdictions are considering whether mandatory 
detention without bond under § 1226(c) infringes upon the fundamental liberty interests of 
criminal aliens who do not concede removability.  See Ramirez-Garcia v. Holder, 550 F. 
App’x 501, 502 (9th Cir. 2013).  The Ninth Circuit vacated a Removal Order for an alien 
who asserted derivative United States citizenship through his mother pursuant to § 201(g) of 
the INA.  See In re Ramirez-Garcia, A12 519 653, 2007 WL 2463883, at *1 (BIA July 24, 
2007).  Ramirez-Garcia was convicted and sentenced to sixty-months imprisonment in 1988 
for trafficking in controlled substances.  Id. at *3.  An Order of Removal was entered on the 
basis of that conviction.  Id. at *1.  Upon release for criminal custody, Ramirez-Garcia was 
placed in mandatory detention under § 1226(c).  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).  In 
Gayle v. Johnson, an alien convicted of the predicate crimes that made him subject to 
mandatory detention, was held without bond under § 1226(c), but was ultimately not found 
removable.  81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 374-75 (D.N.J. 2015).  Thus, his detention served no purpose 
and did not further the government’s underlying purpose of § 1226(c).  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c).  One of the named plaintiffs in the putative class action, Sukh, a Guyanese national, 
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Souter’s concurrence in Demore, he observed that “[s]ome 
individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious 
challenges to removability or claims for relief from removal.  As 
to such aliens . . . the Government has only a weak reason under 
the immigration laws for detaining them.”79 
For example, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Demore, the Seventh Circuit in Parra v. Perryman80 
hypothesized the possible scenario where “it is easy to imagine”81 
that an alien could raise a constitutional challenge to mandatory 
detention if the alien had a good faith basis for challenging his 
removal.82  In Parra, the alien was not successful in this regard, 
but the Court acknowledged the possibility that such a challenge 
could be asserted.83  Mr. Parra, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted 
of “aggravated criminal sexual assault” in 1996 and was found to 
be removable for conviction of an aggravated felony.84  He was 
apprehended and detained without the possibility of posting a 
bond.85 
The alien did not present any good faith reasons—such as 
that he was a United States citizen—that could be used to 
challenge removal, and in fact, the court noted that the case did 
not fall within any of the examples noted because “Parra concedes 
that he is an alien removable because of his criminal conviction, 
and Mexico accepts return of its citizens.”86  The Seventh Circuit 
 
and lawful permanent resident for twenty years, was detained for “nearly 21 months” in a 
correctional facility.  Gayle, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 377.  He was deemed deportable due to 
convictions for assault and theft of services, which are crimes of moral turpitude.  Id.  After 
almost two years, the “[Immigration Judge] granted Sukhu’s application for the adjustment 
of status based on a relative petition filed by his U.S. citizen daughter, and thus, terminated 
his removal proceedings” and released him from immigration custody.  Id. at 378. 
79.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 561 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
80.  Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999). 
81.  Id. at 957. 
82.  Id.  The court in Parra stated the following: 
Section 1226(c) authorizes detention by the Executive Branch without trial, 
and it is easy to imagine cases—for example, claims to persons detained under 
§ 1226(c) who say that they are citizens rather than aliens, who contend that 
they have not been convicted of one of the felonies that authorizes removal, or 
who are detained indefinitely because the nations of which they are citizens 
will not take them back—in which resort to the Great Writ may be appropriate. 
Id. at 957. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Parra, 172 F.3d at 955. 
85.  Id. at 956. 
86.  Id. at 957. 
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adopted the narrow position that Parra did not have any due 
process interests worthy of constitutional protection.87  The Court 
noted that “[t]he private interest here is not liberty in the abstract, 
but liberty in the United States by someone no longer entitled to 
remain in this country . . . the probability of error is zero when the 
alien concedes all elements that require removal (as Parra has 
done).”88  As a result, possible violations of fundamental liberty 
interests were not considered because criminal aliens “subject to 
§ 1226(c) have forfeited any legal entitlement to remain in the 
United States.”89 
In Vang v. Ashcroft,90 a case also decided prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Demore, a District Court in the 
Seventh Circuit found that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 
“as applied to petitioners who have not conceded removability” 
infringed upon the alien’s substantive liberty interests.91  In Vang, 
the District Court distinguished the Parra decision for criminal 
aliens, who unlike Parra, “all demonstrated at least some hope that 
they will not be removed.”92  The Vang decision examined 
conflicting federal district decisions that considered “the 
constitutionality of § 1226(c) as applied to petitioners who have 
not conceded removability,”93 and concluded that “§ 1226(c) 
implicates a fundamental liberty interest as applied.”94 
The District Court applied the heightened scrutiny analysis 
test set forth in United States v. Salerno95 to evaluate the alien’s 
substantive due process claims.96  Salerno held that “the 
government may not infringe a person’s fundamental liberty 
interests, regardless of the process provided, unless it narrowly 
tailors the infringement to serve a compelling state interest.”97  
Vang held that the government’s stated regulatory goals for 
mandatory detention, which included providing for public safety 
 
87.  Id. at 958. 
88.  Id. (italics omitted). 
89.  Parra, 172 F.3d at 958 (italics omitted). 
90.  Vang v. Ashcroft, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
91.  Id. at 1035. 
92.  Id. at 1038.  The court stated, “Where, as here, there is a good faith basis to contest 
removability, however, the Court does not believe Parra precludes a bond hearing.”  Id. at 
1036. 
93.  Id. at 1035. 
94.  Id. at 1037.   
95.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
96.  Id. at 739. 
97.  Vang, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748).  
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and insuring the criminal alien’s participation in removal 
proceedings, were legitimate.98  However, the court held that 
“while legitimate, the goals outlined by Congress do not justify 
the infringement of [criminal aliens’] fundamental rights.”99 
Section 1226(c), as applied to criminal aliens who have good faith 
challenges to their removal, was not narrowly tailored because it 
“sweeps too broadly” by denying bond hearings to all aliens, 
including those who “demonstrated at least some hope that they 
will not be removed.”100 
The Seventh Circuit also considered this issue after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Demore.  In Gonzalez v. 
O’Connell,101 a lawful permanent resident was “found guilty” of 
possession of cocaine and sentenced to two years probation.102  
The government found him removable “as an alien convicted of 
an aggravated felony,” and detained him subject to § 1226(c).103 
He received a Joseph hearing where “[t]he [immigration judge] 
determined that [he] was subject to mandatory detention pending 
removal proceedings under § 1226(c) because he was removable 
as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and of a state drug 
offense.  Therefore bond was not available to [him].”104 
Mr. Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.105 
He asserted that “his right to due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments” was violated “because he raised the 
good-faith argument that he would not in fact be deported.”106  He 
asserted that under Illinois law, his “probationary dispositions” 
were not convictions, and thus he was not deportable “because he 
was not ‘convicted’ of either an aggravated felony, or a state law 
relating to a controlled substance.”107  At the Joseph hearing, Mr. 
Gonzalez was given an opportunity to present evidence that he 
was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c).108 
 
98.  Vang, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1037. 
99.    Id. 
100.  Id. at 1038. 
101.  Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2004). 
102.  Id. at 1012. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1012.  
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 1013 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003)) (“At the 
hearing, the detainee may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, 
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The most important aspect of this decision was that Mr. 
Gonzalez “did not concede his deportability.”109  Although Mr. 
Gonzalez attempted to distinguish the holding in Demore, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Demore was equally applicable to his challenge.110  Although Mr. 
Gonzalez challenged his deportability, the Seventh Circuit had 
previously ruled that his argument was without merit.111  The 
court noted that “[prior decisions], in effect, stripped Mr. 
Gonzalez of the predicate argument underlying his constitutional 
claim – that he has raised a ‘good-faith challenge’ to his 
deportability.”112  The Seventh Circuit reconciled Demore with 
Gonzalez by noting that “[a] distinction between petitioners who 
raise facially meritless claims and those who concede their 
deportability is one of form and not substance.  Both are without 
a legal right to remain in the United States.”113 
The analysis is quite different, however, if an alien has a 
good faith challenge to the DHS’s initial determination of 
removability.  Drawing guidance from Demore, the Seventh 
Circuit identified an important gap in the current due process 
paradigm governing mandatory detention proceedings.114  The 
Seventh Circuit, drawing from Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion 
in Demore, acknowledged that the outcome of Gonzalez’s 
challenge would be different if he had asserted a good faith 
 
was not convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely 
to establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.”). 
109.  Id. at 1014. 
110.  Id. at 1014-15. 
111.  Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1020.  The Seventh Circuit explained: 
It is not necessary, however, for this court to reach this important issue in this 
case.  After the district court’s decision in this case, this court decided Gill v. 
Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2003).  Gill squarely rejected the argument 
that Mr. Gonzalez advanced before the district court that he was not in fact 
“deportable”: that “convict[ion]” for immigration purposes is defined by state 
law, and that he was not “convicted” according to Illinois law because he only 
received a disposition of probation. 
Id. 
112.  Id. at 1020.  The Seventh Circuit jurisprudence determined that a “‘conviction’ 
for immigration purposes is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), and that a probationary 
disposition under 720 ILCS 570/410 following a plea of guilty qualifies as a ‘conviction’ 
under that definition.”  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. at 1012. 
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challenge to his removability.115  The court clearly recognized 
that “[a] wholly different case arises when a detainee who has a 
good-faith challenge to his deportability is mandatorily detained 
under § 1226(c).”116  Although dicta, this analysis paved the way 
for aliens detained subject to § 1226(c) to assert constitutional 
challenges to the DHS’s mandatory detention paradigm. 
Two more recent District Court decisions arising from the 
Seventh Circuit have affirmatively carved out an exception for 
aliens who do not concede removability.  In Papazoglou v. 
Napolitano,117 the alien, a long-term lawful permanent resident, 
filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from mandatory 
detention.118  The DHS determined that he was subject to removal 
because he pled guilty and was convicted of third degree sexual 
assault and physical abuse of a child, not as an aggravated 
felon.119  The immigration judge (IJ) found him eligible for full 
relief from removal due to a petition filed for adjustment of status, 
an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, and an I-
130 visa petition120 filed by his wife, a United States citizen.121  
Mr. Papazoglou was taken into custody and held without bond 
pursuant to § 1226(c) for thirteen months.122  Mr. Papazoglou 
argued that his mandatory detention without bond subject to § 
1226(c) was unconstitutional.123  The District Court looked to the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Parra for guidance.124  The court 
concluded that “[t]he Parra decision left the door open to claims 
made by detainees who had not yet conceded deportability, but 
instead had colorable claims that they were not in fact 
deportable.”125 
 
115.  Id. at 1020-21.  The court cited Justice Souter’s opinion in Demore v. Kim stating, 
“Some individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious challenges to removability 
or claims for relief from removal . . . . As to such aliens . . . the Government has only a weak 
reason under the immigration laws for detaining them.”  538 U.S. 510, 561 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
116.  Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1020. 
117.  Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778 (N.D. Ill. May 
3, 2012). 
118.   Id. at *1. 
119.  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(I) (2012). 
120.  Papazoglou, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *1. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at *2. 
123.  Id. at *4. 
124.  Id. at *2. 
125.  Papazoglou, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *4. 
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Citing Parra, the court found that “questions of due process 
violations” are raised when “aliens who claim they are citizens”; 
“aliens who claim they have not been convicted of the offenses 
that trigger removal”; and “aliens who have no country to which 
they can be removed” are subject to mandatory detention without 
bond.126  Mr. Papazoglou argued “that his mandatory detention 
without bail [was] unconstitutional because he [had] a colorable, 
good faith claim that he [was] not deportable—namely that an IJ 
ha[d] already determined that he [was] eligible to remain in the 
United States.”127  The Seventh Circuit in Parra noted that habeas 
corpus petitions may be appropriate for aliens subject to 
mandatory detention without bond in circumstances where the 
alien has not conceded removability.128 
The court found that the Government “infringed upon the 
detainee’s fundamental liberty interests” because the alien 
“demonstrated a legitimate and good faith reason to contest his 
 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id.; Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Today’s case presents 
none of these possibilities, however, for Parra concedes that he is an alien removable because 
of his criminal conviction, and Mexico accepts returns of its citizens.”); see also Vang v. 
Ashcroft, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
128.  Parra, 172 F.3d at 957 (“[R]esort[ing] to the Great Writ may be appropriate.”).  
However, in Young v. Aviles, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica was subject to 
mandatory detention without a bond hearing after immigration officials determined that he 
was subject to removal.  99 F. Supp. 3d 443, 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  Young pled guilty 
to “possession of approximately twenty pounds of marijuana” with “intent to distribute a 
controlled substance.”  Id. at 445.  Young “was sentenced to ninety days in jail, with credit 
for time served.”  Id.  At the time the District Court issued its opinion, Young had been 
detained without bond for “almost seven months,” which was four months longer than the 
length of incarceration for the underlying conviction.  Id. at 454.   
  Young filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting several arguments to 
distinguish his action from the controlling force of the Demore decision by arguing that “he 
[had] a ‘substantial challenge’ to removability . . . .”  Id. at 452.  Young had 
contemporaneously “filed applications for Cancellation of Removal and asylum.”  Young, 
99 F. Supp. 3d at 446.  The Court found the argument that “his detention violates the Due 
Process Clause” to be “meritless.”  Id. at 453.  The Court concluded “that Young’s continued 
detention without a bond hearing [did] not yet violate due process.”  Id. at 456.  The Court 
explained further:  
With respect to the former, an application for cancellation of removal is not a 
challenge to removability, but rather a request for discretionary relief . . . .   
Unfortunately for Young, “the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore all but 
forecloses the argument that ‘the term “is deportable,” as used in § 1226(c), 
means anything other than an alien who prima facie qualifies for removal,’ 
regardless of whatever forms of discretionary relief may be available, as well 
as the argument that applying the mandatory detention statute to an alien who 
may qualify for discretionary relief is unconstitutional.” 
Id. at 454 (citations omitted). 
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removability, namely that an IJ ha[d] already determined that 
Papazoglou merits full relief from removal.”129  As a result, the 
Court ordered an individualized bond hearing for the alien.130 
The most recent case to consider this issue is Casas v. 
Devane.131  In this case, the criminal alien was convicted of an 
aggravated felony and charged by the DHS with being 
removable.132  The criminal alien was apprehended and detained 
for four months as an alien subject to mandatory detention 
without bond under § 1226(c).133  He challenged the 
constitutional permissibility of his mandatory detention.134  He 
argued that the Seventh Circuit permits aliens to challenge 
mandatory detention where there is a good faith challenge to their 
removability.135 
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Demore concluded that mandatory detention of deportable 
aliens pending removal is constitutionally permissible, but it 
distinguished the holding in Demore from the applicability in 
Casas, noting that Demore applies “to aliens who proffer ‘facially 
meritless’ bases for contesting their removal . . . .”136  Instead, the 
Court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez, noting 
that “a wholly different case arises when a detainee who has a 
good faith challenge to his deportability is mandatorily detained 
under § 1226(c).”137  As to Casas, the court concluded that 
“Casas’ good-faith basis for challenging his removal 
distinguishes him from aliens who by conceding their 
deportability have ‘forfeited any legal entitlement to remain in the 
United States.’”138 
Casas sought to challenge his deportability on the basis that 
“his criminal defense attorney affirmatively misinformed him that 
pleading guilty to the charged offense would not subject him to 
 
129. Papazoglou, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *4-5. 
130. Id. at *6. 
131. Casas v. Devane, No. 15-cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293598 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2015). 
132. Id. at *1. 
133. Id. 
134. Id.  “Casas’ [sic] argues that his detention without an individualized bond hearing 
is unconstitutional because he has a good-faith basis for contesting his removal.”  Id. at *2. 
135. Casas, No. 15-cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293595, at *2.  The government “concede[d] 
that the Seventh Circuit has ‘left open the possibility that an alien [with a] legitimate 
challenge to removability might not be subject to mandatory detention.’”  Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138.  Id. at *3. 
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deportation.”139  Upon concluding that Casas presented a good 
faith challenge to his deportability, the Court ordered his release 
from mandatory detention “unless he receives an order from an 
Immigration Judge who has determined after an individualized 
bond hearing that Casas’ continued detention is necessary to 
prevent a risk of flight or a threat to public safety.”140  The Court 
concluded that offering Casas an opportunity to challenge his 
detention in an individualized bond hearing would not “thwart” 
the Congressional purpose underlying the mandatory detention 
statute for aliens “who have a good-faith basis for believing they 
may ultimately be permitted to remain in the country.”141 
V.  DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
The field of Immigration law differs significantly from other 
areas of law regulated by the federal government.142 “Congress 
traditionally exercises authority over matters of immigration and 
exclusion through passage of immigration legislation.”143  Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to 
“establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”144  In Fiallo v. 
Bell,145 the Supreme Court reasserted the principle that “‘over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”146  Although 
the Supreme Court recognizes Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate the field of immigration, that power is not without 
constitutional safeguards.  In INS v. Chadha,147 the Court limited 
 
139. Casas v. Devane, No. 15-cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293598, at *3.  “[T]he Seventh 
Circuit has affirmed that modification of a criminal conviction . . . can save an alien from 
deportation.”  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  See generally Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1465 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Although 
the Constitution fails to delegate specifically the power over immigration, the Supreme Court 
recognized almost a century ago that the political branches have plenary authority over 
immigration matters as an inherent concomitant of national sovereignty.”). 
143.  Id. at 1466; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898) 
(“The power, granted to Congress by the Constitution, ‘to establish an uniform rule of 
naturalization,’ was long ago adjudged by this court to be vested exclusively in Congress.”). 
144.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
145.  430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
146.  Id. at 792. 
147.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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the scope of Congressional authority to “constitutionally 
permissible means of implementing its power.”148 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantee of due process protection “applies to all ‘persons’ 
within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence 
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”149  Supreme 
Court jurisprudence acknowledged, in decisions dating back to 
the 1886 decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,150 that all aliens present 
in the United States are persons entitled to assert both 
substantive151 and procedural152 due process protections against 
governmental action.153  However, Congress is not required to 
provide aliens with the full bundle of constitutional rights 
afforded to United States citizens.  The Supreme Court, in 
Mathews v. Diaz,154 acknowledged and approved of the 
constitutional dichotomy that distinguishes aliens from citizens 
by noting that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
 
148.  Id. at 941. 
149.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).  In Demore v. Kim, Justice Souter 
asserted the following: 
It has been settled for over a century that all aliens within our territory are 
“persons” entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause.  Aliens 
“residing in the United States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long 
as they are permitted by the government of the United States to remain in the 
country, to the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the protection of the laws, 
in regard to their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and criminal 
responsibility.”  The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1893), settled any 
lingering doubt that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause gives aliens a 
right to challenge mistreatment of their person or property. 
538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted).   
150.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886). 
151.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (“So-called ‘substantive due 
process’ prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ or 
interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (citation omitted). 
152.  Id.  “When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property 
survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.  This 
requirement has traditionally been referred to as ‘procedural’ due process.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which 
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment . . . . The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
153.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 
238 (1896). 
154.  Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
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naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules 
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”155 
The Supreme Court, in Reno v. Flores,156 examined the 
scope to the substantive due process rights afforded by the 
Constitution.157  Citing its decision in Foucha v. Louisiana,158 
Justice O’Connor noted that “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has 
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”159  The “liberty” 
interest protected by the Fifth Amendment “denotes . . . freedom 
from bodily restraint . . . .”160  These longstanding due process 
protections are equally afforded to aliens during pending of 
removal proceedings.  In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel 
Mezei,161 the Court held that “aliens who have once passed 
through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after 
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness 
encompassed in due process of law.”162 
In Demore, the Supreme Court held that the detention of a 
criminal alien pursuant to § 1226(c) does not infringe upon the 
alien’s due process rights granted by the Fifth Amendment.163 
The Court expressed the “longstanding view that the Government 
 
155.  Id. at 79-80.  “Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, 
or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.”  Id. at 77. 
156.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
157.  Id. at 301-03. 
158.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
159.  Reno, 507 U.S. at 315 (O’ Connor, J., concurring); see also Forbes v. Perryman, 
244 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The government may not interfere with the 
fundamental liberty interests of an individual, such as his interest in physical freedom, unless 
its actions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.”) (citing Reno, 507 U.S. 
at 301-03); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause . . . provides heightened protection against governmental interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests.”). 
160.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Reno, 507 U.S. at 316 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s 
affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through 
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the 
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protection of the Due Process Clause . . .”) (quoting 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). 
161.  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
162.  Id. at 212; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose 
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional 
protection.”). 
163.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 
228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The due process afforded aliens stems from those statutory rights 
granted by Congress and the principle that ‘minimum due process rights attach to statutory 
rights.’”). 
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may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited 
period necessary for their removal proceedings.”164  However, 
while there are no legitimate procedural due process concerns for 
criminal aliens who concede removability, the same is not true for 
criminal aliens who assert good faith challenges to the 
government’s ability to remove them from the country.165  As to 
this cohort of criminal aliens, the Due Process Clause affords 
protection against infringement of their substantive liberty 
interests.166 
This proposition is consistent with the Court’s longstanding 
jurisprudential framework.  First, unlike criminal aliens who 
concede that they are subject to removal, criminal aliens who 
assert good faith challenges to their ultimate removal, retain their 
right to remain in the country, and equally important, also retain 
their substantive liberty interest to be free from unreasonable civil 
detention.167 
Second, no “sufficiently compelling governmental 
interest[]”168 can be furthered from enforcing mandatory 
detention without bond pursuant to § 1226(c) for criminal aliens 
who can assert good faith challenges to their removal.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salerno169 offers 
guidance in this area.  In Salerno, the Court balanced the 
“individual’s strong interest in liberty” against “the 
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety . . . .”170  
 
164.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 526; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) 
(“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure.  Otherwise aliens arrested for 
deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of 
deportation proceedings.”). 
165.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 561. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[T]he fact that a statute serves its purpose in general fails to justify the detention of an 
individual in particular.  Some individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious 
challenges to removability or claims for relief from removal . . . . As to such aliens . . . the 
Government has only a weak reason under the immigration laws for detaining them.”). 
166.  See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). 
167.  Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The private interest here 
is not liberty in the abstract, but liberty in the United States by someone no longer entitled to 
remain in this country . . . . [T]he probability of error is zero when the alien concedes all 
elements that require removal.”). 
168.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). 
169.  Id. at 747. 
170.  Id. at 748-50.  “On the other side of the scale, of course is the individual’s strong 
interest in liberty.  We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right.  
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The Court held that an individual’s liberty interests can be 
outweighed in circumstances where “sufficiently compelling 
governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous 
persons.”171  Under those circumstances, the Court determined 
that “we have found no absolute constitutional barrier to detention 
of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation 
proceedings.”172  However, when examining mandatory detention 
without bond under § 1226(c) for criminal aliens who do not 
concede removal, the scale does not balance in favor of 
subordinating their fundamental liberty interest. 
Demore was clear that the government’s articulated 
rationales underlying § 1226(c) to reduce the risk of flight and to 
minimize the danger to the public safety were sufficiently 
compelling interests that warrant restrictions to the personal 
liberty of criminal aliens.  However, mandatory detention without 
bond for this limited class of aliens does not further the stated 
governmental interest of preventing flight risks and protecting 
public safety.  Criminal aliens who can assert good faith 
challenges to removal are not flight risks.  On the contrary, these 
aliens have every incentive to participate vigorously in their 
removal proceedings in order to successfully defend and resolve 
against governmental efforts to remove them from the country. 
Additionally, there is no reasonable basis upon which to 
categorically conclude that this limited class of aliens poses a 
significant threat to public safety.  Criminal aliens subject to § 
1226(c) are detained after release from criminal custody.  This 
means that those criminal aliens have been tried and punished for 
commission of the predicate crimes enumerated in sections (A)-
(D) of § 1226(c)(1).  Subjecting them to additional detention 
because of the same predicate crimes for which they were 
previously incarcerated can only be classified as punishment.  
Historically, “[d]eportation is not a criminal proceeding and has 
never been held to be punishment.”173  No regulatory goals or 
purposes can be articulated, addressed, or solved by further 
detention of aliens who can assert good faith challenges to their 
 
But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is 
sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society.”  Id. at 750-51. 
171.  Id. at 748. 
172.  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.  “Under these circumstances, we cannot categorically 
state that pretrial detention ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”  Id. at 751. 
173.  Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952). 
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removal.  In this context, mandatory detention without bond 
becomes penal in nature and violative of the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process protections afforded to all persons in the United 
States.174  As such, these aliens are entitled to have an opportunity 
to establish that they are not subject to removal before being 
subjected to mandatory detention without bond under § 1226(c). 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The infringement of due process interests of criminal aliens 
subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c) can be 
minimized if criminal aliens are permitted to assert their good 
faith challenges to removability during the Joseph hearing.  
Currently, the scope of Joseph hearings only permits criminal 
aliens to argue that they are not “properly included” within the 
category of criminal aliens subject to mandatory detention under 
§ 1226(c). 175 
The practical benefits associated with adopting a uniform 
federal immigration policy regarding prolonged mandatory 
detention of criminal aliens in limited situations where the alien 
does not concede removal would be significant.176  In addition to 
being cost effective to release aliens who ultimately will not be 
removed from the United States, it would address the lack of 
available beds for thousands of aliens currently in detention, and 
 
174.  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 557-58 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Heightened, substantive due process scrutiny . . . uncovers serious 
infirmities in § 1226(c).  Detention is not limited to dangerous criminal aliens or those found 
likely to flee, but applies to all aliens claimed to be deportable for criminal convictions, even 
where their underlying offenses are minor . . . .”). 
175.  For other proposals for modification to the mandatory detention framework, see 
id. at 578-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (“The [bail] standards are more protective of a 
detained alien’s liberty interests than those currently administered in the Immigration and 
Nationalization Service’s Joseph hearings.  And they have proved workable in practice in 
the criminal justice system.  Nothing in the statute forbids their use when § 1226(c) 
deportability is in doubt . . . . So interpreted, the statute would require the Government to 
permit a detained alien to seek an individualized assessment of flight risk and dangerousness 
as long as the alien’s claim that he is not deportable is (1) not interposed solely for purposes 
of delay and (2) raises a question of ‘law or fact’ that is not insubstantial.  And that 
interpretation, in my view, is consistent with what the Constitution demands.”). 
176.  See Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 3d 692, 709 n.25 (D.N.J. 2014) (“Lastly, I note 
that Plaintiffs argue that mandatory detention is problematic because it may make it more 
difficult for mandatorily detained aliens to secure legal representation in their removal 
proceedings.  In that connection, Plaintiffs cite a recent study showing both (i) the lack of 
representation for mandatorily detained aliens, and (ii) a positive correlation between 
representation and a favorable outcome for the alien in the removal proceedings.”). 
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decrease the cost and manpower currently utilized to apprehend 
criminal aliens. 
The individualized benefits derived from modifications to 
the mandatory detention policy would be especially important to 
criminal aliens who are lawful permanent residents.  If afforded 
an individualized bond hearing, this group of criminal aliens 
could avoid the consequences of prolonged periods of detention 
and unnecessary disruption to their personal lives resulting from 
futile periods of mandatory detention. 
Additionally, modifications to the mandatory detention 
policy will lead to the enforcement of § 1226(c) in a uniform 
manner across all of the federal circuits.  Currently, only criminal 
aliens who are inside of the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit are 
able to challenge the harsh consequences of §1226(c)’s 
mandatory detention without bond.  Inconsistent rulings for 
similarly situated criminal aliens facing mandatory detention 
without bond, where the only variable is the “accident of 
geography”177 between criminal aliens apprehended in and 
outside of the Seventh Circuit, are contrary to the longstanding 
principle that immigration laws must be enforced in a uniform 
manner.  The constitutional framers envisioned that immigration 
laws would be enacted and enforced in a “uniform manner.”178  
As immigration is solely within the purview of the federal 
government,179 inherent in the application and interpretation of 
federal legislation is the premise that “federal statutes are 
generally intended to have uniform nationwide application.”180 
 
177.  Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations omitted). 
178.  See generally The Federalist No. 32, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (referencing 
the Congressional authority to establish “an Uniform Rule of Naturalization” was intended 
to “necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a distinct rule, 
there could be no Uniform Rule.”  Hamilton’s analysis applies with equal force to the 
necessity for uniformity within federal common law jurisprudence within the field of 
immigration law.); see also Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1073 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005) (“The uniformity requirement in immigration law is rooted textually in the 
Constitution’s Naturalization Clause . . . .”). 
179.  See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration 
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). 
180.  Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989); see 
also Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1992) (In citing Holyfield, the Second Circuit 
noted that “[t]he [Holyfield] Court first observed that because the Indian Child Welfare Act 
was designed to implement a uniform federal policy—the same is true with the Immigration 
and Nationality Act—domicile was not to be determined according to the law of the forum, 
but rather required a uniform federal definition.”); Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 
905, 914 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have identified nothing in the legislative history to rebut the 
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The commitment to uniform administration of a federal 
immigration policy is recognized across federal jurisprudence.  
The Third Circuit in Gerbier v. Holmes181 noted that “[i]ndeed, 
the policy favoring uniformity in the immigration context is 
rooted in the Constitution.”182  Judicial efforts to foster uniformity 
within the field of immigration are founded upon notions of 
fundamental fairness and a desire to avoid the consequences of 
disparate treatment arising from jurisdictional variances.183  For 
example, the Third Circuit in Gerbier compared conflicting 
classifications of the exact criminal activity by two different 
states.  Concerned about possible disparate treatment, the court 
noted that “[t]his cannot be what Congress intended in 
establishing a ‘uniform’ immigration law.”184  Furthermore, the 
Third Circuit, citing Francis v. INS,185 added that “[f]undamental 
fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like 
circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated 
in a like manner.”186  Modification of Joseph hearings for criminal 
aliens who do not concede that they are subject to removal would 
address these concerns, and prevent the continuing infringement 
of their substantive due process interests. 
 
 
presumption that Congress intended uniform application of the immigration laws, and there 
is evidence that Congress intended the interpretation that we adopt.”). 
181.  Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002). 
182.  Id. at 311. 
183.  See Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
The court considered the role that “the uniformity principle has played a central role in 
immigration, including in construing and evaluating the validity of immigration statutes.”  
Id.  The Gerbier court recognized the nexus between uniformity and equity noting that 
“[f]undamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like circumstances, 
but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner.”  Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 
312. 
184.  Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 312. 
185.  Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
186.  Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2002).  In addition to questions of 
fundamental fairness, there are equal protection questions raised when federal statutes are 
not uniformly enforced.  See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).  Using the 
analysis from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Francis court applied the rational 
basis test and using the minimal scrutiny, the court noted that the application of a federal 
statute “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”  Francis, 532 F.2d at 272.  “We do not dispute 
the power of Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation for different 
groups of aliens.  However, once those choices are made, individuals within a particular 
group may not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any 
legitimate governmental interest.”  Id. at 273. 
